Security audit / outside-in and web applications
Security audit
Brightmoor Logistics SRL
brightmoor.example
Sample report / invented company
Brightmoor Logistics SRL does not exist, and neither do its addresses. The structure, the level of detail and the way findings are proven are exactly those of the reports we deliver.
Security audit / outside-in and web applications
Security audit
Brightmoor Logistics SRL
brightmoor.example
Your main website and your shop work well and we found nothing wrong with how they look to a visitor. The problems are in what sits around them: a website folder that gives away a password, a VPN that needs an update, and customer invoices anyone can download.
Two findings need action this week. Items 1 and 2 together remove the realistic risk of someone getting into your systems, and both are a morning's work for whoever looks after your servers.
| # | Severity | Finding |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Critical | The company website hands out its own source code, with the customer portal's database password inside |
| 2 | Critical | The office VPN runs a version with a flaw criminals are using right now |
| 3 | High | 2,140 customer invoices can be listed and downloaded by anyone from cloud storage |
| 4 | High | 14 staff email accounts appear in public data leaks, 6 of them with a password |
| 5 | High | The customer portal accepts unlimited password guesses |
| 6 | Medium | Anyone can send email that claims to come from @brightmoor.example |
| 7 | Medium | Remote desktop on a warehouse PC is reachable from the internet |
| 8 | Low | A forgotten WordPress test site runs four plugins past their support |
| 9 | Info | The certificate on mail.brightmoor.example expires in 9 days |
Proven: we showed it works, without changing or keeping your data. Confirmed: checked by hand against your systems.
We started from one thing, your domain name. Public certificate records and DNS led to 23 sub-sites and 6 servers. These are the ones that matter:
| Address | What it is | Result |
|---|---|---|
| www.brightmoor.example | Your website | fine |
| shop.brightmoor.example | Your web shop | fine |
| portal.brightmoor.example | Customer portal | Finding 5 |
| vpn.brightmoor.example | VPN gateway | Finding 2 |
| files.brightmoor.example | Invoice storage | Finding 3 |
| test.brightmoor.example | Old WordPress test site | Finding 8 |
| mail.brightmoor.example | Mail server | Finding 9 |
16 more sub-sites point nowhere or redirect to the main site. They are listed in the appendix so you can tidy them up.
When the website was last updated, the developer's working folder (called .git) was copied to the server with it. Anyone who knows where to look can download it, and with it the whole history of the site's code.
One of the files in that history holds the password the customer portal uses for its database.
With that password, someone on the internet can read every customer account in the portal: names, addresses, orders. That is a personal data breach you would have to report to ANSPDCP within 72 hours.
Tools that look for this run against millions of sites every day. It is one of the first things they try.
GET https://www.brightmoor.example/.git/HEAD 200 OK ref: refs/heads/main Downloaded 412 objects, rebuilt the code history config/database.php, commit 7f3a2c1 (March 2025): 'host' => 'portal-db.internal' 'password' => 'K*************2' (masked in this report)
The box that lets staff work from home runs a software version with a known flaw. It lets a stranger take over the box without a password.
The flaw is on the US government's list of weaknesses that criminals are exploiting right now (CISA KEV), and attackers use it to get into company networks.
The VPN box sits between the internet and your office network. Whoever controls it can reach every computer behind it.
We confirmed the version from what the box tells every visitor. We did not try the attack: that would put your office network at risk, and the version alone is enough.
vpn.brightmoor.example:443 SSL VPN login page
reported version 7.2.4
known flaw CVE-2024-21762, out-of-bounds write
on CISA KEV since 9 February 2024 actively exploited
fixed in 7.2.7 and laterWe checked all 51 addresses on your domain against 10.6 billion leaked records. 14 appear in at least one leak. For 6 of them a password leaked too, and 2 of those passwords still opened the account's webmail when the owner tried them in front of us.
| Account | Where it leaked | Password too |
|---|---|---|
| j****.p*****@brightmoor.example | 2023, file-sharing service | yes |
| o****@brightmoor.example | 2024, online shop | yes |
| a*******@brightmoor.example | 2021, social network | no |
Passwords are never printed in a report, never sent by email and never kept with your data. Addresses are masked here; your copy names them so you know whom to call.
Your domain does not tell other mail servers what to do with email that claims to be from you but is not. So they deliver it.
Sends your customers an invoice from "accounts@brightmoor.example" with a new bank account. Logistics companies are a favourite target, because they send invoices every day.
_dmarc.brightmoor.example TXT (no record)
brightmoor.example TXT v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all| # | What to do | Closes |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Remove the .git folder from the web server and change the database password | Finding 1 |
| 2 | Update the VPN gateway to the vendor's fixed release, then check its logs since September | Finding 2 |
| 3 | Make the storage bucket private and turn on access logging | Finding 3 |
| 4 | Reset those 6 passwords and require two-step sign-in for every account | Finding 4 |
| 5 | Lock out after repeated failures and add two-step sign-in for staff | Finding 5 |
| 6 | Publish a DMARC policy, move it to reject after two weeks | Finding 6 |
| 7 | Close port 3389 on the warehouse router; use the VPN instead | Finding 7 |
| 8 | Delete test.brightmoor.example, or put a password in front of it | Finding 8 |
| 9 | Renew it, and turn on automatic renewal | Finding 9 |
brightmoor.example and every sub-site of it, the two office internet lines and the customer portal, from 12 to 13 November between 09:00 and 17:00, as written in the permission you signed on 10 November.
We did not try to guess the password of any real account, did not change or keep any of your data, and did not test servers that are not yours, such as Cloudflare's.
3,486 automated alerts went in. 9 findings came out, each one checked by hand. Anything we could not test is marked "not tested", never "clean".