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Sample report / invented company

What an ACIDRIPP Security Audit report looks like.

Brightmoor Logistics SRL does not exist, and neither do its addresses. The structure, the level of detail and the way findings are proven are exactly those of the reports we deliver.

ACIDRIPP Security AuditSample01

Security audit / outside-in and web applications

Security audit

Brightmoor Logistics SRL
brightmoor.example

Sub-sites found23
Servers behind them6
Confirmed findings9
Fix this week2critical
Report date14 November 2026
Testing window12 to 13 Nov, 09:00 to 17:00
PermissionSigned 10 Nov 2026
Revision1, signed
Sample report / invented company14 November 2026
ACIDRIPP Security AuditBrightmoor Logistics SRL02
01

Summary for decision makers

Your main website and your shop work well and we found nothing wrong with how they look to a visitor. The problems are in what sits around them: a website folder that gives away a password, a VPN that needs an update, and customer invoices anyone can download.

Two findings need action this week. Items 1 and 2 together remove the realistic risk of someone getting into your systems, and both are a morning's work for whoever looks after your servers.

#SeverityFindingEvidence
1CriticalThe company website hands out its own source code, with the customer portal's database password insideProven
2CriticalThe office VPN runs a version with a flaw criminals are using right nowconfirmed
3High2,140 customer invoices can be listed and downloaded by anyone from cloud storageProven
4High14 staff email accounts appear in public data leaks, 6 of them with a passwordconfirmed
5HighThe customer portal accepts unlimited password guessesProven
6MediumAnyone can send email that claims to come from @brightmoor.exampleconfirmed
7MediumRemote desktop on a warehouse PC is reachable from the internetconfirmed
8LowA forgotten WordPress test site runs four plugins past their supportconfirmed
9InfoThe certificate on mail.brightmoor.example expires in 9 daysconfirmed

Proven: we showed it works, without changing or keeping your data. Confirmed: checked by hand against your systems.

Sample report / invented company14 November 2026
ACIDRIPP Security AuditBrightmoor Logistics SRL03
02

What the internet can see

We started from one thing, your domain name. Public certificate records and DNS led to 23 sub-sites and 6 servers. These are the ones that matter:

AddressHosted atWhat it isResult
www.brightmoor.exampleCloudflareYour websitefine
shop.brightmoor.exampleCloudflareYour web shopfine
portal.brightmoor.exampleHetzner, GermanyCustomer portalFinding 5
vpn.brightmoor.exampleOffice line, BucharestVPN gatewayFinding 2
files.brightmoor.exampleAmazon S3, FrankfurtInvoice storageFinding 3
test.brightmoor.exampleHetzner, GermanyOld WordPress test siteFinding 8
mail.brightmoor.exampleOffice line, BucharestMail serverFinding 9

16 more sub-sites point nowhere or redirect to the main site. They are listed in the appendix so you can tidy them up.

Sample report / invented company14 November 2026
ACIDRIPP Security AuditBrightmoor Logistics SRL04
03

Your website gives away a password

Critical Proven
In plain language

When the website was last updated, the developer's working folder (called .git) was copied to the server with it. Anyone who knows where to look can download it, and with it the whole history of the site's code.

One of the files in that history holds the password the customer portal uses for its database.

Why this matters

With that password, someone on the internet can read every customer account in the portal: names, addresses, orders. That is a personal data breach you would have to report to ANSPDCP within 72 hours.

Tools that look for this run against millions of sites every day. It is one of the first things they try.

Evidence
GET https://www.brightmoor.example/.git/HEAD      200 OK
  ref: refs/heads/main
Downloaded 412 objects, rebuilt the code history
config/database.php, commit 7f3a2c1 (March 2025):
  'host'     => 'portal-db.internal'
  'password' => 'K*************2'   (masked in this report)
What we did not do: we did not use the password, connect to the database or keep a copy of the code. The download was deleted after this report was signed.
Sample report / invented company14 November 2026
ACIDRIPP Security AuditBrightmoor Logistics SRL05
04

The office VPN needs an update now

Critical confirmed
In plain language

The box that lets staff work from home runs a software version with a known flaw. It lets a stranger take over the box without a password.

The flaw is on the US government's list of weaknesses that criminals are exploiting right now (CISA KEV), and attackers use it to get into company networks.

Why this matters

The VPN box sits between the internet and your office network. Whoever controls it can reach every computer behind it.

We confirmed the version from what the box tells every visitor. We did not try the attack: that would put your office network at risk, and the version alone is enough.

vpn.brightmoor.example:443   SSL VPN login page
  reported version     7.2.4
  known flaw           CVE-2024-21762, out-of-bounds write
  on CISA KEV since    9 February 2024   actively exploited
  fixed in             7.2.7 and later
Sample report / invented company14 November 2026
ACIDRIPP Security AuditBrightmoor Logistics SRL06
05

Staff accounts in public data leaks

High confirmed

We checked all 51 addresses on your domain against 10.6 billion leaked records. 14 appear in at least one leak. For 6 of them a password leaked too, and 2 of those passwords still opened the account's webmail when the owner tried them in front of us.

Leaked with a password6
Leaked, email only8
Not found in any leak37
AccountWhere it leakedPassword too
j****.p*****@brightmoor.example2023, file-sharing serviceyes
o****@brightmoor.example2024, online shopyes
a*******@brightmoor.example2021, social networkno

Passwords are never printed in a report, never sent by email and never kept with your data. Addresses are masked here; your copy names them so you know whom to call.

Sample report / invented company14 November 2026
ACIDRIPP Security AuditBrightmoor Logistics SRL07
06

Anyone can send email as you

Medium confirmed
In plain language

Your domain does not tell other mail servers what to do with email that claims to be from you but is not. So they deliver it.

What an attacker does with this

Sends your customers an invoice from "accounts@brightmoor.example" with a new bank account. Logistics companies are a favourite target, because they send invoices every day.

_dmarc.brightmoor.example   TXT   (no record)
brightmoor.example          TXT   v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all
Sample report / invented company14 November 2026
ACIDRIPP Security AuditBrightmoor Logistics SRL08
07

Action plan, in order

#What to doEffortCloses
1Remove the .git folder from the web server and change the database password15 minutesFinding 1
2Update the VPN gateway to the vendor's fixed release, then check its logs since September1 hourFinding 2
3Make the storage bucket private and turn on access logging30 minutesFinding 3
4Reset those 6 passwords and require two-step sign-in for every accountHalf a dayFinding 4
5Lock out after repeated failures and add two-step sign-in for staff2 hoursFinding 5
6Publish a DMARC policy, move it to reject after two weeks30 minutesFinding 6
7Close port 3389 on the warehouse router; use the VPN instead1 hourFinding 7
8Delete test.brightmoor.example, or put a password in front of it1 hourFinding 8
9Renew it, and turn on automatic renewal10 minutesFinding 9
Then we check again. After your fixes we retest every finding and issue a new signed revision of this report, so you have a clean record to show customers, insurers or an auditor.
Sample report / invented company14 November 2026
ACIDRIPP Security AuditBrightmoor Logistics SRL09
08

Scope, permission and method

Known weaknesses checked410,553
Actively exploited, checked first1,772
Leaked records searched10.6bn
Ports probed per server65,535
What we were allowed to test

brightmoor.example and every sub-site of it, the two office internet lines and the customer portal, from 12 to 13 November between 09:00 and 17:00, as written in the permission you signed on 10 November.

Limits we set ourselves

We did not try to guess the password of any real account, did not change or keep any of your data, and did not test servers that are not yours, such as Cloudflare's.

3,486 automated alerts went in. 9 findings came out, each one checked by hand. Anything we could not test is marked "not tested", never "clean".